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Article 6

JOINT TENANCY IN NEBRASKA

WORDS NECESSARY FOR CREATION OF A JOINT TENANCY
John Wilson*
The use of joint tenancies has increased in Nebraska within
the past decade to the point where it has been estimated that more
than half of the conveyances recorded are of that type." In view
of the widespread use of this joint form of ownership many questions will arise in the future concerning the language necessary to
create a joint tenancy. Section 76-205 of the Revised Statutes of
Nebraska provides:
In the construction of every instrument creating or conveying
... any real estate or interest therein, it shall be the duty of
the courts of justice to carry into effect the true intent of the
parties, so far as such intent can be collected from the whole
instrument, and so far as such intent is consistent with the rules
of law.

If property is granted to "A and B jointly", the question
arises whether this is sufficient indication of the grantor's intent
to create a joint tenancy in A and B, or is it necessary for the
draftsman to make that intent more definite by providing that the
grant is to "A and B as joint tenants with right of survivorship
and not as tenants in common," or some similar language.
In light of the above statutory language, the sole question
is whether a conveyance to "A and B jointly" was intended to
create a joint tenancy. In determining this point, the use of the
word "jointly" is controlling. It is elementary that significance
must be given to every word. 2 Fortunately the legal effect of the
word "jointly" has been passed upon by courts and discussed by
writers of authority. Jones,3 a leading author in real property,
says:
Under a statute which provides that a conveyance to two or more
persons shall be construed to create a tenancy in common unless
it shall manifestly appear from the tenor of the instrument that it
was intended to create an estate in joint tenancy, a conveyance
to the grantees "jointly" sufficiently indicates an intention to
create a joint estate in them, without adding the words negativing
an estate in common. "As tenants in common are two or more
Member, Nebraska Bar.
'See Moodie, Some Dangers of Joint Tenancy, 29 Neb. L. Rev. 235
(1950).
2In Re Darr's Etate, 114 Neb. 116, 206 N.W. 2 (1926); Albin v.
Parmek, 70 Neb. 740, 98 N.W. 29 (1906); Rupert v. Penner, 35 Neb. 587,
53 N.W. 598 (1892).
3 2 Jones, The Law of Real Property in Conveyancing § 1786 (1939);
see also, 2 Thompson, Real Property § 1724 (1939).
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persons who hold possession of any subject of property by several
and distinct titles, the word 'jointly' can find no place in describing an estate to be held by them."
There is no substantial difference between deeding or devising
land to two persons and the survivor of them, and deeding or
devising land to two persons to be held in joint tenancy.

In deciding In Case v. Owen4 the Indiana Supreme Court was
required to construe a conveyance to "L.R. and J.R., jointly." The
court was confronted with a statute which provided that all conveyances made to two or more persons created a tenancy in common unless an intent to create a joint tenancy appeared. The
court argued that tenants in common are two or more persons
who hold possession of property by several and distinct titles.
Since the word "jointly" indicates one title held by tvo persons,
to construe the grant as creating a tenancy in common would require the court "to strike out and wholly reject the word 'jointly'. '
Construing a similar conveyance and statute, the same result was
reached in a Michigan case., The issue of whether the negative
4139 Ind. 22, 38 N.E. 395 (1895).
5 Id. at 24.
GMurray v. Kator, 221 Mich. 198, 190 N.W. 667 (1922).
The deed
provided that C.S. and M.S. held the property as "heirs jointly."
The
court held that a joint tenancy was created. The statute provided that
all grants to two or more persons created estates in common, unless expressly declared to be joint tenancy. In light of this statute, the court
said:
Defendant insists that an estate in common was created by
the conveyance.
Our statute (3 Comp. Laws 1915, Sec.
11562) provides:
All grants and devises of lands, made to two or more
persons, * * * shall be construed to create estates in
common, and not in joint tenancy, unless expressly declared to be in joint tenancy.
The effect of this statute is to reverse the common-law rule
relating to the termination of such estates. Does the word
"jointly" inserted in the premises of this deed, declare an
estate in joint tenancy? While the law does not favor joint
tenancies, it nevertheless permits their creation.
In re:
Blodgett's Estate, 197 Mich. 455, 461, 163 N.W. 907. It is
apparent from the face of the deed that the word "jointly"
was inserted after the paragraph had been written. Had it
not been inserted, it is clear that an estate in common would
have been created. An intent on the part of the grantors
to create an estate other than in common may be inferred.
In Smith v. Smith, 71 Mich. 633, 638, 40 N.W. 21, 23, it was
said:
The object to be arrived at by courts in construing deeds
or other contracts is to ascertain clearly the intention
of the parties.
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words "and not as tenants in common" were necessary in the conveyance "to A and B, jointly" was squarely presented to the New
Jersey court.7 The court came to the conclusion that such negative language was not necessary to constitute a joint tenancy.

The language which follows, quoted from French v. Carhart,
1 N.W. 102, is expressive of the rule that the circumstances
surrounding the preparation and execution of the deed will
be considered in arriving at such intent. The word "jointly"
was inserted for some purpose. None other can be gleaned
from the word used when read with the remainder of the
deed that an intent on the part of the grantors to create an
estate in joint tenancy.

7 Coudert v. Earl, 45 N.J. Eq. 654, 18 Atl. 220 (1889).
The court
stated.
The question is, whether, in order to create an estate in joint
tenancy under that act, it is necessary to use the negative as
well as the affirmative words in it, or indeed, any particular
form of language.
I do not think the question is open to the least debate or
doubt. The statute, as I interpret it, does not undertake to
prescribe any particular mode or language in which the parties shall express their intention. It says the intention to
create the estate in question must be expressly set forth in
the grant; that is, it must not be left to inference or implication. And here it is to be observed, that the two estates
mentioned are entirely inconsistent with each other; they
cannot exist and be held at the same time by the same parties
in the same property. If an estate is held by several persons
as joint tenants, it is not and cannot be held by them at the
same time as tenants in common. It follows, that to say
of an estate that it is held by several persons as joint tenants, is to say, in effect, that it is not round or black. And
so when a gift to more than one person says that the estate
shall be held by them as joint tenants, it is, in effect, expressly, and not by inference or implication merely set forth
that it is the intention of the parties that the estate shall
be held in joint tenancy and not in tenancy in common. In
such case the result is the effect of direct and express assertion, and not of inference or implication merely. The object
of the statute was to prevent joint tenancies being created
by mere inference from the context or by doubtful language, and it confined the parties to direct and explicit expression. In my judgment that result is attained when it is declared to be the intention of the parties that the estate shall
be held by them as joint tenants. The use of the words "and
not as tenants in common" adds nothing to the sense of the
others, and is mere tautology and surplusage.
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A Michigan case, Hoyt v. Winstanley,s illustrates an apparent
exception to the universal rule. In Michigan a conveyance to husband and wife creates a common law estate by the entirety. Where
such an estate exists, adding the phrase "as joint tenants" or the
word "jointly" in the grant is held to add nothing to the meaning
and the estate remains a tenancy by the entirety. This result is
reached because a tenancy by the entirety is held to be a form of
joint tenancy, merely an enlargement thereof, and including its
characteristics. In its opinion the court states:
In this state, where the common-law rule is unchanged by statute,
a conveyance to husband and wife conveys an estate in entirety,
but may create one in joint tenancy or in common, if explicitly
so stated in the deed. The question then in the case under consideration is the construction to be placed on the language of
To
the deed to "Jasper Winstanley and wife as joint tenants."
"Jasper Winstanley and wife" conveys an estate by the entirety.
The explanatory words, "as joint tenants," would of themselves
be sufficient to indicate that an estate in joint tenancy was intended to be conveyed were it not for the fact that an estate by
the entirety is a species of joint tenancy and is commonly included
In that class. We have held that a grant to a husband and wife
jointly conveyed an estate in entirety. The same word "jointly"
used in a conveyance to grantees, not husband and wife, conveys an estate in joint tenancy. So too the words "joint tenants,"
when coupled with "husband and wife" do not bear the ordinary meaning; for an estate by the entirety is a joint tenancy.
It is an estate in joint tenancy plus the unity of the marital relation.

Of course the apparent exception in the Hoyt case has no application in Nebraska since Kerner v. McDonaldO held that "the

common-law rule of estate by entirety does not obtain in this jurisdiction." It would seem that where tenancy by the entirety has
been abolished there is a strong policy for holding the conveyance a joint tenancy instead of a tenancy in common. Such a re-

sult has been reached in Wisconsin. 10

It seems that the law is clear. A conveyance to husband and
wife, jointly, or as, joint tenants, illustrates an intention to create
a joint tenancy. Text writers and courts so hold whenever the
question has been considered, notwithstanding statutes that require the intent of the grantor to be definitely expressed. Nebraska had no such statute. Nebraska merely has a statute requiring the "true intent" to control. When the question arises,

the Nebraska court will probably follow the weight of authority
and hold that such a conveyance creates a joint tenancy.
S Hoyt v. Winstanley, 221 Mich. 515, 191 N.W. 213 (1923).
960 Neb. 663, 84 N.W. 92 (1900).
If Haas v. Williams, 218 Wis. 429, 261 N.W. 216 (1935).

